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FIXTURE LIENS IN FLORIDA

FIXTURE LIENS UNDER CHAPTER 9 OF THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE IN FLORIDA
The enactment of chapter 679 of the Florida Statutes substantially changed
the regulation of security interests in personal property and fixtures in
Florida. This chapter now governs any transaction intended to create a
security interest in personal property or fixtures' and abolishes for practical
purposes many of the traditional distinctions that formerly existed among
chattel mortgages, conditional sales agreements, and other lien or title retention contracts. 2 Distinctions are no longer based on formal lines, but rather
on functional purposes, regardless of nomenclature.3 The Code uses the term
"security interest" to refer to any interest in personal property or fixtures
that secures payment or performance of an obligation. 4 Since the provisions
of chapter 679 governing rights, obligations, and remedies apply regardless
6
of where title lies, former distinctions are in many cases unnecessary.
While it is now much simpler to create and file a security interest, the
new method is not without problems. This fact is especially true in the area
of fixture liens. This note deals with security interests in fixtures and specifically with the new Code provisions regarding the creation of the interest and
the establishment of priorities among fixture security interests and other
7
real estate interests.
It is necessary to preface any discussion with a brief consideration of the
current status of the fixture provisions in Florida. When the Code initially
became effective in this state in January 1, 1967, the provisions were substantially those of the 1962 Official Text.8 However, effective July 1, 1967,
Florida Statutes, section 679.9-313 (section 9-313 of the Code) was radically
altered.9 As a result, Florida and two other states have adopted a minority
position substantially different from other Code jurisdictions. Both Florida
and Ohiolo have almost identical statutory provisions, while California simply
deleted section 9313 from its enactment." Therefore, it is necessary to examine
both the majority position, which governed in Florida for six months, and the
present Florida position.

1. FLA. STAT. §679.9-102 (1967).
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §9-101, Comment 1 (1962).
3. Id.
4. FLA. STAT. §671.1-201 (37) (1967).
5. Fr. STAT. §679.9-202 (1967).
6. Although for tax purposes, for instance, location of title may be important.
7. It is beyond the scope of this note to deal with priorities among competing security
interests in the same collateral. This is covered primarily by FLA. STAT. §§679.9-301, -312
(1967).
8. Compare FLA. STAT. §679.9-313 (1967) with UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §9-313.
9. Fla. Laws 67-264 (1967).
10. Omo REv. CODE §1309.32 (Anderson Supp. 1967).

2.

11.

CAL, COMm. CODE §9313

(Deering 1963) notes that UNIFORM

COMMERCIAL CODE

§9-313 was not included in the statute enacting the Code in California.
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DEFINITION OF A FIXTURE UNDER FLORIDA LAW

The initial determination to be made, of course, is whether the collateral
in question is a fixture. Under section 679.9-313,12 which sets out the priority

of security interests in fixtures, the section's provisions are inapplicable "to
goods incorporated into a structure in the manner of lumber, bricks, tile,
cement, glass, metal work and the like . ..-13-

construction materials gener-

ally. Other than this preliminary exclusion, non-Code Florida law determines
if and when goods become fixtures.14 Since there is no statutory definition in
Florida, the definition becomes a matter of case law.
In Commercial Finance Co. v. Brooksville Hotel Co., 15 the Florida supreme
court stated that determination of whether a chattel had become a fixture was
based upon three requirements. The first requirement was annexation to
the realty, either actual or constructive; secondly, adaptation or application to
the use or purpose of that part of the realty to which the chattel was
attached; and finally, the intention of the party making the annexation that
the chattel be a permanent accession to the realty. 16
In Commercial Finance, a hotel company had entered into a conditional
sales contract to purchase a commercial refrigeration unit of the "walk-in"
freezer type. It was subsequently installed, with the necessary wiring and
pipes, by being built into the walls. By the agreement, the dealer retained
title until the purchase price was paid. Further, the creditor reserved the right
to repossess, and the contract stipulated that the unit was to remain personalty.
Commercial Finance Co., assignee of the dealer's contract, obtained a repossession order upon the buyer's default of payment, and the hotel company
sought an injunction against removal. The hotel company alleged that by its
affixation, the refrigerator had lost its character as personalty and had become
a fixture, and consequently was not subject to repossession. This contention
was rejected on appeal. Since the agreement stipulated that the unit was to
remain personal property, the chattel failed to meet the third test - intent
to make a permanent accession to the freehold. Because title was not in the
owner of the freehold and he had agreed as to the personal character of the
goods, the court reasoned that it could not have been his intent to make
the unit a permanent part of the freehold.1 7 Therefore, even though goods
become so attached to realty as to become "fixtures" under an older common
law "mode of annexation" doctrine, as between the parties and others with
notice there might be agreement that they were to remain personalty, and the
courts would not override the freedom so to contract. The court further
stated that in inferring intent, four factors were to be considered: (a) the
nature of the article annexed; (b) the relation of the party making the

12. FLA. STAT. §679.9-313 (1967).
13. FLA. STAT. §679.9-313 (1) (1967).
14. Id.
15. 98 Fla. 410, 123 So. 814 (1929).
16. Id. at 816

17. Id.
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annexation; (c) the structure and mode of annexation; and (d) the purpose
or use for which the annexation had been made.18
A year later, in the case of Greenwald v. Graham, 9 the supreme court
reached substantially the same conclusion and applied the three-fold test,
but without referring to its earlier decision. In both cases, the court acknowledged its decision to be in accordance with the more modem English and
American decisions and against the older common law "mode of annexation"
doctrine.20 In addition, both cases quoted from an 1894 case, Seedhouse v.
Broward,21 which stated that "[i]n establishing the fact whether a given thing
is or is not a fixture upon land, the intention of the owner in placing it here
[sic], [is] to be gathered from his declarations, and from the character, relations
and purposes of the property is an important element, sometimes of controlling importance." 22 It was this common ground upon which both the Greenwald and Commercial Finance decisions were based.
In Greenwald, the title to fixtures and furniture in question was in the
owner of the freehold. He had severed and sold certain electrical switches,
boxes, and interior ornaments, as well as the box office, from a theater building
on the property four days before a foredosure sale. As between the mortgagee and the purchaser of the goods in question, the disputed question was
the character of the articles as fixtures. The court reasoned that the owner
intended the fixtures placed in the walls of the theater to become permanent
accessions to the freehold and ruled they were subject to the prior mortgage.
The furniture and interior ornaments, on the other hand, were not. The
question, however, was initially one of intent. Once the intent of the owner
was established, the annexed fixture became subject to the prior realty mort2
gage, even though not specifically mentioned in the mortgage instrument.
In both cases, the intent of the owner was a controlling factor. However,
this statement gives rise to a caveat. An agreement between the owner and
other parties involved in the affixation of chattels to realty, may not be
effective against mortgagees or subsequent purchasers of the realty without
notice of the agreement. This general rule was stated in Burbridge v. Therrell.2 4 Involved there was a light frame cottage, which the owner of the
cottage and the owner-mortgagor of the land agreed was to remain personalty.
The court announced that subsequent purchasers or mortgagees, without
notice of an agreement that an annexation should not become a fixture
were not bound by the agreement, being entitled to the property as apparently
forming part of the land. 25 Notice, of course, estopped such an assertion. A
building or other fixture actually or constructively annexed became part of
the mortgage security. However, the annexation might be such that the
18. Id.
19. 100 Fla. 818, 130 So. 608 (1930).
20. Id. at 610; Commercial Fin. Co. v. Brooksville Hotel Co., 98 Fla. 410, 123 So. 814,

816 (1929).
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

34 Fla. 509, 16 So. 425 (1894).
Id. at 429-30.
100 Ma. 818, 130 So. 608, 610-11 (1930).
110 Fla. 6, 148 So. 204 (1933).
Id. at 207.
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building did not become a part of the realty ab initio. If it might be inferred
from the character of the structure or from the circumstances of its erection
that it was not intended to remain permanently on the property, then it
might be considered a severable erection. The consideration seemed primarily to be whether the building had become annexed. If there were
apparent annexation from the beginning, the building could not be severed,
notwithstanding an agreement to the contrary. Unlike the previous cases, the
intent of the parties here was not necessarily the determining factor since a
third party mortgagee was involved. While a mortgagor could place a movable structure on his property, he needed to be careful that the structure
was not considered annexed without his mortgagee's consent and hence might
possibly impair the mortgagee's security in the realty. In Burbridge, the
2
court ruled that a building was prima facie assumed to be an accession. 6
In addition, a foreclosure sale terminated the rights of the mortgagor with
whom the agreement had been made, and the parol agreement was not
effective against the purchaser at the sale. It would seem that the only party
who might ever be disadvantaged by a dubious annexation would be a subsequent taker under the mistaken belief that he was acquiring rights in the
annexations. However, the court specifically stated that the annexations
inured to the benefit of a prior mortgagee as well - as an increased security
for his debt.2

7

The key was annexation.

The issue of the prior mortgagee had actually been decided earlier in
Seedhouse v. Broward.28 If the property in question had been annexed to
the land in such a manner as to stamp it with the attributes of a fixture, it
made no difference that it was placed upon the land subsequent to the
mortgage. As between the mortgagor and the mortgagee and persons with
notice, the fixture was subject to the mortgage. 29 The problem in Seedhouse
was whether the equipment was so placed as to stamp it with fixture qualities.
It was at this point that the court raised the intent criterion as controlling. 3°
In this case, the mortgagee of the real property had assumed the equipment
was to be a fixture. The real property was not of sufficient value to cover
the amount of the loan, which had allegedly been made to cover the cost of
the machinery. The court remanded the case to the trial court to allow
the plaintiff-mortgagee to prove an alleged contemporaneous agreement that
the defendant-mortgagor intended to purchase the equipment with the loan
money and annex the machinery to the property as fixtures. The court noted
that proof of such agreement would not of its own force enlarge the mortgage
to include things that were not in fixtures in law or fact, but would only
show the intent with which the machinery was placed upon the property. 31
There was a further pre-Code consideration regarding a party's right to
remove collateral affixed to the realty. Even though an agreement existed
that the article remain personalty, or the presumption of fixture could be
26.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id.
27. Id. at 206.
Seedhouse v. Broward, 34 Fla. 509, 16 So. 425 (1894).
Id. at 429.
Id. at 430.
Id.
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overcome, the property could not be removed if it would result in substantial
injury to the freehold. This doctrine was enunciated in Florida in Standard
Motors Finance Co., Inc. v. Central Farmer's Trust.3 2 The conflict was
between -the conditional seller of an interior sprinkling system and the
mortgagee of the building. The system was installed within the walls subsequent to the perfection of the mortgage. The court concluded that the
agreement that the collateral remain personal property should be given effect
whenever possible. Although removal required tearing out certain floor
boards and plaster, the court stated that such damage was repairable and
held for the seller. Even elevators in a seventeen story building have been
deemed removable without substantial damage and foreclosure allowed~3
However, the seller in Interstate Trust and Banking v. Warren3- was not
so fortunate. The facts were similar to those of Standard Motors, but the
court denied plaintiff's right to complete repossession. In this case, removal
of the piping would have caused irreparable damage to certain parts of the
building. The creditor was only allowed to repossess the sprinkler heads and
exterior feed tank.
The substantial damage referred to is physical damage, not the fact that
such removal would render the building useless for the purpose intended such as a production facility.35 As will be seen, however, the Code has
abolished the "substantial injury" doctrine. This change eliminated the rather
incongruous situation that a chattel might not be deemed a fixture, yet be
such an integral part of the realty that its removal would substantially
destroy the property.
There is one further general exception to the rule that fixtures become
part of the realty. Customarily "trade fixtures" installed by a lessee to conduct his business are removable at the termination of the lease.36 The presumption is that the tenant placed the fixtures on the property to promote
his own interests, not enrich the landlord.37 Such things as air-conditioning
units utilized by the lessee of a restaurant have been deemed trade fixtures
and removal permitted.38 The substantial injury doctrine applied, though,
regardless of "trade-fixture" characterization.39
The questions that undoubtedly arise regarding the status of fixtures in
Florida are not unique in this jurisdiction. In fact, an early and often cited
40
American case stated:
It is not to be disguised that there is an almost bewildering difference
and uncertainty in the various authorities, English and American,
on the subject of fixtures. ..

. One thing is quite dear in the midst

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

117 Fla. 217, 157 So. 520 (1934).
Wheat v. Otis Elevator Co., 23 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1927).
69 F.2d 368 (5th Cir. 1934).
Meena v. Drousiotis, 146 FLa. 168, 200 So. 362 (1941).
Wetjen v. Williamson, 196 So. 2d 461 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1967).
37. Id.

38. Ridgeflield Investors, Inc. v. Holloway, 75 So. 2d 208 (Fla. 1954).
39. Id.
40. Strickland v. Parker, 54 Me. 263, 265 (1866).
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of the darkness; and that is, that no general rule, applicable to all
cases, and to all relations of the parties, can be extracted from the
authorities.
Curiously, the present definition in Florida, as set out by the Commercial
Finance case, appears to have first been enunciated in an early Ohio case,
Teaff v. Hewitt,41 where the three general criteria, as well as the four determinates of intent, are almost verbatim as reported in the Florida decision.
Like Florida, Ohio enacted the Official Text provisions, lived with them for
42
a short while, and amended them.
The provisions of section 679.9-313 (1) provide that the initial determination of whether the Code section applies depends upon state law. Therefore,
in Florida, the case law set out above will continue to govern the application
of the Code provisions, despite the fact that the rules of law set out in those
cases regarding priorities are no longer applicable. It is this rather anomalous
situation that requires a basic understanding of the older common law
before delving into the new Code provisions.
OPERATION OF THE CODE

Under Florida Statutes, section 679.9-401 (1) (b), it is now possible to
perfect a security interest in fixtures, or goods to become fixtures, by recording
the lien in the office and in the record book where a mortgage on the real
estate concerned would be recorded. 4 3 There is no requirement for an additional filing with the chattel records. 44 In Florida, of course, this filing would
be with the real estate records kept by the circuit court clerk in the county
45
where the realty is located.
Provisions of the Official Text and Florida Between January and July 1967
Under the Official Text provisions, and in Florida, between January 1,
1967, and July 1, 1967, it is necessary to understand and distinguish two
important terms: "attachment" and "perfection." Both refer to the operation
of establishing a security interest under the Code. (As will be noted later,
the new Florida provisions render "attachment," as an act in itself, unimportant in the area of fixture liens.) Under section 679.9-204,46 a security
interest under the Code cannot "attach" until the last of three events occurs:
(1) there is agreement that it attach (meaning the bargain of the parties),
(2) value is given, and (3) the debtor acquires rights in the collateral. 4T
In order to "perfect," this interest it is necessary that a fourth step occur:
a financing statement must be properly filed. 48 When the last of these four
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

1 Ohio St. 511 (1853).
Law of May 18, 1961, §1309.32, 130 Laws of Ohio 13, 159 (amended 1963).
See 66 Op. ArT'y GEN. FLA. 52 (1966).
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §9-401, Comment 2; Op. ATr'y GE'. FLA., supra note 43.
FLA. STAT. §28.22 (2) (1967).
FLA. STAT. §679.9-204 (1967).
Id. at §679.9-204 (1).
FLA. STAT. §679.9-302 (1) (1967).
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events occurs, the security interest, in this case in a fixture, is perfected. Prior
to the amendment in this state, lien priorities could have arisen merely by
attachment in certain instances. 49 In determining the lien priorities in fixtures
under the Official Text and the first Code provisions in Florida, the initial
question was whether or not the security interest "attached" before or after
the goods became affixed to the realty.
If the attachment came prior to affixation, Code section 9-313 (2) governed. 50 The fixture security interest had priority over claims of all parties
with an existing interest in the realty, except as stated in subsection (4).51
Only attachment prior to affixation was necessary to establish priority in all
cases except three, dealt with by former section 679.9-313 (4). The three
realty interests were those of (a) a subsequent purchaser for value, (b) a
creditor with a subsequent lien obtained by judicial proceeding, or (c) a
creditor of record who made a subsequent advance. Priority over these three
interests required perfection prior to affxation. 5 2 If a party without knowledge of the security interests, and prior to its perfection, acted to put himself
in one of three categories of subsection (4), then his interest would not be
junior to the interest in the fixture.
Example One: Attachment Prior To Affixation. For example, a vendor
agreed to sell goods and subsequently installed them such that they became
fixtures. Vendee made a downpayment and signed a conditional sales agreement. At this point a security interest had attached prior to affixation and,
under old section 679.9-313 (2), the vendor had established a senior lien on
the soon-to-be fixture over all existing interests in the real estate. However,
if one of the three contingencies of subsection (4) occurred, the vendor lost
his priority over that creditor or subsequent purchaser. In order to be senior,
the vendor must have perfected his security interest prior to the occurrence
of the contingency. It would also be noted that a purchaser at a real estate
foreclosure, other than the mortgagee himself, was a "subsequent purchaser"
within the subsection (4) exception.
If the attachment came after the goods had been affixed to the realty, old
section 679.9-313 (3) governed. The security interest was valid against all
subsequently acquired interests in the realty, with the exception again of
the three instances noted above. However, as to persons holding interests
in the realty at the time of attachment, the security interest was invalid unless
the party having the realty interest had either consented in writing to the
security interest, or disclaimed an interest in the good as fixtures.
Example Two: Attachment Subsequent To Affixation. Altering example
one somewhat, suppose the transaction was a cash sale and trade-in. After
installation, the vendee borrowed from a lender who took what would have
49. FLA. STAT. §679.9-313(2) (1965) (although not effective until Jan. 1, 1967, the Code
was printed in the back of the 1965 Fla. Stat.).
50. Id.
51. FLA. STAT. §679.9-313(4) (1965).
52. Id.
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formerly been a chattel mortgage on the new fixture acquisition. At the
time of attachment of the lien, the lender's priority was junior to any realty
interest in the vendee's property. Unless he could secure a disclaimer of
interest in the fixture or a consent to the security interest, the lender's
security interest would remain junior. Furthermore, until the lender perfected his security interest, it would be subordinate to any interest acquired
by parties described by subsection (4).
New Amendment Provisions in Florida Effective July 1967
By the provisions of the new amendment, sections 679.9-313 (2)-(5) were
substantially altered. Presently, the establishment of senior fixture liens is
dealt with exclusively by subsection 679.9-313 (2), while subsection (3) deals
with recovery of security upon default.
The amendment made several significant changes in the former section
679.9-313. First, "attachment," no longer has any independent efficacy. As to
the acts of the parties, the present requirements are that the lien be "perfected" not merely "attach.- 5_3 Also significant is the fact that a distinction is
no longer made between whether the establishment of the lien occurred
before or after the physical affixation of the goods to the property. Under
the new amendment, the significant point in time is when both affixation and
perfection have occurred.5 4 Regardless of which occurs first, the occurrence
of the last of these two events establishes the benchmark for determining
fixture lien seniority among the competing interests.
If the real estate interest is prior in time to both perfection and affixation,
section 679.9-313 (2) (a) governs. In such cases the fixture lien would, by
statute, be junior to the existing real estate interest. Without the intervention of the third party realty interest, the fixure lienor can never establish a
senior lien on the goods as fixtures. However, the statute provides that by
obtaining a written consent or a disclaimer of interest in the goods as fixtures,
the vendor or creditor may establish a primary lien upon the secured property.
In effect, the new amendment merely requires visible evidence both at
the site of the real estate and in the courthouse records. Thus, in examples
one and two neither the vendor in example one, nor the lender in example
two, can establish a primary security interest against a prior mortgagee or
secured party. Only by the acquiesence of this prior interest holder can the
security interest take a senior position.
On the other hand, in example one, if the vendor "perfects" his lien prior
to affixation, then at the time his goods become physically annexed to the
vendee's property, his priority is established. If at any subsequent time a
mortgage is taken on the property the mortgagee would have only a second
claim against the fixture. In the second example, where the lender took a
security interest in a newly installed fixture, his lien would still be junior to
any interest existing in the real estate; and until he perfects his security

53. FLA.
54. Id.

STAT.

§679.9-313 (2) (1967).
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interest, his lien will be junior to any real estate interest arising between
installation and perfection.
Obviously, the new amendment has wrought a substantial change in the
establishment of fixture security interests. An unwitting reliance upon the
substantive provisions of the Official Text or similar foreign state requirements, would in most cases result in no priority at all. Mere "attachment"
without "perfection" is insufficient. Without the intervention of the holder
of a prior interest in the real estate, the fixture security interest can never
stand first in priority. Failure to meet these new requirements may well leave
the secured party without compensation upon a default, a foreclosure by the
real estate mortgagee, or a sale to a subsequent purchaser.
FILING
Under the Official Text provisions, the secured party should "attach"
and "perfect" his lien prior to affixation. By present Florida law, prior attachment is of no importance any longer. 55 What is necessary is that the
secured party be aware of any prior encumbrances upon the real estate before
he takes his final step - whether it is the perfection of the lien or the affixation of the goods. Logically, the secured party would first examine the
records, obtain any consents or disclaimers necessary, perfect by filing, and
then install the goods. This procedure would avoid the unfortunate situation
where the lienor affixes and later learns he cannot obtain a senior interest.
Where this is not possible, the vendor should perfect his security interest as
soon as possible after affixing the goods since an intervening real estate
interest could defeat his lien priority. The perfection, of course, primarily
involves filing a proper financing statement.
As previously mentioned, attachment may occur merely by agreement
and affirmative acts between the debtor and the creditor. However, somewhat
in the spirit of the real property recording statutes, perfecting requires a
filing sufficient to give some notice to third parties who may subsequently
acquire interests in the realty and hence in the fixtures. Generally what is
filed is the financing statement, 56 although a copy of the security agreement
may be sufficient as a financing statement if signed by both parties. 57 Under
the statute, prior to its amendment effective July 1, 1967, a description of
the property sufficient to identify it was required-no legal description of
the land to which the fixture was attached was necessary. 58 Under the statutory scheme of the new section 679.9-402 (1), the name and address of the
debtor, the name and address of the secured party, and the description of
the goods affixed or to be affixed is required as before, but in addition there
must be a legal description of the realty to which the affixation is made, and
the name of the record owner or lessee of the realty must be indicated. 59
56. FLA. STAT. §679.9-402 (1967).
55. FLA. STAT. §679.9-313 (1967).
57. Id. at §679.9-402 (1) (b).
58. FLA. STAT. §§679.9-402 (1), -110 (1965).
59. FLA. STAT. §679.9-402 (1967). FLA. STAT. §679.9-110 (1967) was also amended

to

conform with the legal description requirements where real estate is involved.
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The completed statement is filed with the real property records in the
office of the clerk of the circuit court in the county where the real property
is located.60 Regarding filing with the clerk, Florida enacted a special section
to supplement the Code. 6 By this section, there is no requirement of oath,
acknowledgement, or proof of execution. In addition, no document is deemed
"filed" unless accepted and recorded by the filing officer.62 Mere presentation
for filing is insufficient where filing with the clerk is required.
Once filed, the statement is effective for five years, unless the maturity
date is specified for a shorter period. If the document has a stated maturity
there is a sixty day "grace period" at its expiration, after which its effectiveness lapses.6 3 The security interest then becomes unperfected. However, the
secured party may file a continuation statement to retain his perfected interest
beyond the maturity date or statutory five-year limitation.6- If the financing
statement had a stated maturity date, the secured party may file a continuation
statement within six months before maturation or sixty days after; otherwise
he must file within six months of the five-year expiration date.65 A continuation statement need only identify the original agreement by file number,
state that the original statement is still effective, and be signed by the secured
party. 66 Upon filing of the continuation statement, the perfected interest is
extended for five years from the last effective day of the original. Timely
filing of continuation statements may extend the security interest indefinitely.67
Having established a priority over all other creditors, the secured party
is entitled to repossess upon default. The only requirement is that he reimburse any encumbrancer (who is not the debtor and who has not otherwise
agreed) for the cost of repairing physical damage.68 This reimbursement does
not include damages resulting from diminution in real estate value caused
by absence of the goods or necessity of replacement.69 This provision is a
complete reversal of the "substantial injury" doctrine previously applied in
Florida. A fixture lienor might have been denied repossession of his fixture
security because removal would have wrought a "substantial injury" to the real
estate prior to the enactment of the Code. Now, however, the mortgagee
can only require that the lienor post a damage bond to cover the cost of
repairs necessitated by the removal of the fixture, and give reasonable notice
of intent to remove. 70 He cannot thwart the removal by showing the structure
would be destroyed by the taking. It is conceivable, (although doubtful) that

60. FLA.
61. FLA.
62. FLA.

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

STAT.
STAT.
STAT.
FLA. STAT.
FLA. STAT.

§679.9-401 (b) (1967).
§679.9-4011 (1967).
§§679.9-403 (1), -4011 (1967).
§679.9-403 (2) (1967).
§679.9-403 (3) (1967).

Id.
Id.
Id.
FLA. STAT.

§679.9-313 (3) (1967).

Id.
Id.
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an inexpensive structure could be razed to allow access to a valuable fixture,
if the lienholder valued the fixture security more than the cost of the building.
Although the enactment of the Code provides some solutions to the conflicts that existed between interests in fixtures and realty, it is by no means a
universal panacea. First, all of the foregoing is inapplicable if the goods in
question are not deemed fixtures by the courts. One of the purposes of the
Code is to facilitate commerce through custom, usage, and agreement, 71 but
this is not necessarily a new purpose. Many of the pre-Code cases attempted
to protect the creditor's rights in the goods by recognizing "title retention"
agreements, looking to intent, or allowing removal in cases of no substantial
injury. The Code does not alter the previously established legal definition
of fixtures, but it is submitted that the Code will effect changes by allowing
the establishment of a superior security interest in fixtures. For instance,
goods often retained their character as personality until paid for, so that the
vendor might maintain a chattel lien superior to the realty mortgagee. Since
this treatment as personalty is no longer necessary, can it be said as a matter
of law that the parties intended the goods to remain personalty until paid
for, and then become fixtures? The effect of the Code would seem to weaken
such argument before the courts.
Nevertheless, a classification problem still exists. Section 679.9-401 (2)
provides that a good faith filing made in an improper place is effective regarding the collateral to the extent that it complies with the filing requirements. While at first glance, this would seem to vitiate the error of filing
(with the chattel records) what was later determined to be a fixture, such
is not the case. The good faith provisions only avoid striking out of a whole
financing statement covering multiple types of collateral. For example, suppose a financing statement were filed that included goods that were deemed
business equipment, as well as goods that were deemed fixtures. If the filing
were made in the county clerk's office with the chattel records, and with the
secretary of state's office, the statement would be sufficient to perfect as to
those goods that were deemed business equipment. However, despite the
seller's good faith belief that all the property included in the financing
statement was business equipment (and hence properly filed), a subsequent
determination that some of the goods were in fact fixtures would void that
part of financing statement covering the fixtures, and his good faith belief
would be of no avail in court.7 2
The subsection does make actual knowledge of the financing statement
sufficient to put a third party on notice, however.73 But the decisions have
held that filing in an improper place does not meet the requirements of part
IV of article 9, and only knowledge can vitiate such an error.74 The solution
of course is simple enough: if the classification is questionable, file with both
fixtures and chattels. If the goods are deemed consumer goods or farm equip71.

FLA. STAT. §671.1-102 (1967).

72. In re Baker (E.D. Wis. 1967), 4 P & F UCC

REP. SERV. 723 (1967).
73. FLA. STAT. §679.9-401 (2) (1965).
74. In re Dumont-Airplane & Marine Institution, Inc., 203 F. Supp. 511 (S.D.N.Y.
1962); In re Lux's Superette, Inc., 206 F. Supp. 368 (E.D. Pa. 1962).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1968

11

Florida Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 2 [1968], Art. 4
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXT

ment, filing is still with the clerk of the circuit court, though in different
records;7 5 if any other personal property such as business equipment, filing
is with the secretary of state. 76 In any case, a prudent party seeking to secure
will file both as a chattel and a fixture to protect his security interest, since
it is a simple matter to file another copy of the financing statement. For even
if both parties to the security agreement concede the goods are to remain personalty, the court may take an approach similar to Burbridge, and classify
the goods as fixtures. In such a case, filing as a chattel will not protect the
secured party. His interest will remain unperfected.
CONCLUSION

As it can be seen, the enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code in
Florida wrought a complete change in the fixture lien provisions of this
state's law. The subsequent amendment has, of course, sacrificed the interjurisdictional uniformity in this area that the Code sought to provide. In
addition, part of the simplicity of establishing a superior lien upon goods
to be affixed to the realty has all but vanished. Florida's new provisions
definitely impose a greater burden upon the seller or potential lienor than
do the Official Text provisions. The secured party must now file an extensive statement to maintain his priority over even a preexisting mortgagee,
and obtain a disclaimer of consent.
However, the new fixture provisions are not without merit. Requiring
the filing of a statement including the legal description and the record owner
or lessee will facilitate the searching of titles and prevent misinformation
among creditors, unintentional or otherwise. In a sense, while deviating
from the uniformity of the Code, it provides a certain degree of uniformity
in the real property filing. The average purchaser is not likely to think in
terms of the previously discussed cases when he views his prospective purchase
or security. He may very well assume that many of the appurtenances attached
to the realty are in fact a part of the realty and dismiss any question as to
their possibly being fixtures. Under the Official Text provisions, a search of
the title might very well turn up nothing indicating a lien upon any part
of the real estate or improvements, since street addresses in most cases bear
no resemblance to legal descriptions. Likewise, the Official Text provides
only for the name of the purchaser, who may easily be one other than the
owner or the lessee. This provision renders the use of a grantor-grantee record

book practically useless. Florida's amended provisions cure these ills. Whether
these advantages outweigh the disadvantages created by the difficulty of perfecting remains to be seen and undoubtedly depends upon the critic's position
in the security transaction.
Undoubtedly, the greatest problem, which exists and will continue to
exist, is the problem of defining the term "fixture." Academically, the problem
is not unduly difficult, but as a practical matter it is apparently monumental.
Obviously, neither the Code nor Florida's amendment has made any attempt
75.
76.

FLA. STAT. §§679.9-401 (1) (a), (b) (1967).
FLA. STAT. §§679.9-401 (1) (c) (1967).
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